**From the Drug War to the Security Czar**
In the troubled city of Culiacán, Sinaloa, Mexico’s Secretary of Security Omar García Harfuch was recently seen parading through the streets alongside members of the National Guard and the Mexican Army. The images of his visit depict him as a prominent figure amidst a heavily militarized entourage. His presence marks the strongest visibility of a federal security secretary since the tenure of Genaro García Luna under President Felipe Calderón.
Since Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration, when the security secretariat was dissolved, Mexico has gone through a series of reforms. It was reestablished in 2018 by then-President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, appointing Alfonso Durazo—who famously ordered the release of Ovidio Guzmán López during a controversial federal operation—as its initial head. Now, under the leadership of President Claudia Sheinbaum, García Harfuch has been dubbed the “Security Czar,” demonstrating both fame and notoriety in his role.
García Harfuch’s police career began under the administration of Felipe Calderón, a presidency criticized by López Obrador and whose imprint Sheinbaum continues to reject publicly. Despite Sheinbaum’s declarations of steering away from Calderón’s drug war tactics, García Harfuch’s early career and tactics have strong foundations in that era’s strategies—reliance on armed forces, intelligence, and cooperation.
His current engagement involves integrating Mexico’s diverse security forces, Gogon collaboration devoid of a dedicated police force—now the militarized National Guard. Many see his efforts at exerting federal influence on state and municipal security appointments as part of a larger strategy to bolster control over regions, especially those governed by the Morena party, by placing federales in strategic positions.
In Tijuana, former promises by the mayor to appoint a well-regarded retired Colonel as the security head were overturned following federal direction to choose a figure with a long career in the national security and intelligence services instead. Similarly, in Baja California Sur, the Navy’s imposition of officers in municipal security posts highlights this systematic approach by the Security Czar.
García Harfuch also reinstates a focus on intelligence with the establishment of a Sub-secretariat of Intelligence to address crime akin to the dismantled CISEN, despite criticisms. While it’s too early to determine the effectiveness of his strategies, the persistence of violence in places like Culiacán and Tijuana hints at the complexity of turning the tide on longstanding issues of crime and insecurity.
**Secondary Article: National Responses to Garcia Harfuch’s Strategies**
Significant attention has been given to Omar García Harfuch’s tactical decisions. His efforts in regions heavily influenced by criminal organizations have drawn both commendation and scrutiny. In Sinaloa, partnerships between state and federal security forces are being hailed by some local officials as necessary for maintaining order, though critics argue that the federal presence undermines local autonomy.
Meanwhile, within Mexico City, where García Harfuch previously held a significant security role, analysts note a declining trend in certain crime rates during his tenure. Yet, skeptics are quick to point out that such improvements may not directly translate to other regions like Tijuana or Culiacán due to differing local dynamics and challenges.
This ongoing debate over centralized versus localized control in combating the deeply entrenched issues of organized crime and violence continues to capture national discourse, as stakeholders across political, security, and civil sectors weigh in on the best course for Mexico’s enduring battle against drug-related crime.