### Primary Article: Constitutional Boundaries or Pressures? The Rationales Behind Limiting Overrepresentation
Last week, the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF) resolved a pivotal case regarding the limits of overrepresentation in the allocation of federal deputies. This issue has sparked extensive debate in the public opinion and the legal community within the country.
Such discussions beyond the walls of the Electoral Tribunal are essential in a democracy with a deliberative and pluralistic vocation. However, some discussions went beyond mere intellectual debate, crossing reasonable boundaries and transforming into real pressures and threats, many of which were public on social media.
A significant portion of academia, public opinion, and of course opposition politicians, following the results of the June 2 election, focused their debate on urgently demanding the TEPJF to disregard or reinterpret the constitutional text, legal framework, and all precedents in the matter to achieve what they deemed to be more fair. They argued that, by using a different criterion than the one always used, a better relationship between votes and legislative seats in the Chamber of Deputies could be achieved.
However, for a majority of four members of the Superior Chamber, this request was impossible to fulfill. For a constitutional judge, the only possible action is to apply the Constitution and provide security and certainty to the parties by reiterating precedents.
For a constitutional magistracy, the correct course of action is to adhere to supreme norms and not yield to pressures or even threats from those seeking to influence a judicial decision. This is precisely how an essential principle of their work is brought to reality: judicial independence.
In this context, the TEPJF confirmed the agreement of the General Council of the INE, which determined that the limit of overrepresentation in the allocation of federal deputies is verified by political party, and not by coalition.
Why was this decision made? The Mexican system is not purely proportional. Mexico has a mixed system: 300 deputies are elected by relative majority, and 200 by proportional representation, as established in Article 52 of the Constitution.
This means that the system does not seek an exact equivalence between votes and seats but rather aims to ensure that all political forces have representation, even if they did not win in their districts.
Our legal norms mandate that the verification of overrepresentation limits, when allocating deputies by proportional representation, is done considering each political party, as outlined in Article 54, Section V, of the Constitution, and Article 15, Section III, of the General Law of Electoral Institutions and Procedures.
This judicial interpretation is not new: it has been established and ratified in all TEPJF precedents since 2009, notably in cases SUP-REC-693/2015 and SUP-REC-943/2018.
These precedents were and remain clear and, thus, predictable for all: political forces, citizens, and for us as members of the Tribunal, tasked with ultimately resolving this controversy.
The Tribunal’s majority opted for an interpretative scheme that not only privileged the explicitness of norms but also honored its precedents and considered the equality in the historical application of the proportional representation system.
Applying one interpretation of the proportional representation formula for some political forces (benefited in the past) and another for others (benefited in the present) would have resulted in inequality and suspicions.
The Tribunal cannot guide its decisions based on party convenience or in response to the clamor of a social sector.
Institutional channels for modifying current electoral law exist. If we wish to apply a different proportional representation system or a different methodology for the formula, the Constitution and law must be reformed. That is a legislative, not a judicial, task.
It is not about presuming that the issues resolved by high courts are dispassionate or socially non-critical. In fact, judges are always subject to pressures from individuals or interest groups.
However, the important thing is to confront these pressures by never submitting to anything or anyone and demonstrating that even in contexts that could cloud our actions, we have resolved according to the law. And we have done so with a decision aligned with legal rationality.
The limits on overrepresentation must not be owed to pressures on interpreters but exclusively to the Constitution and the tribunal’s precedents. Our role was to apply it, ensure its compliance, and thereby realize the rule of law. Nothing more, nothing less.
**Felipe de la Mata Pizaña, Justice of the Superior Chamber of the Electoral Tribunal of the Judicial Power of the Federation.**
### Secondary Article: Recent Developments in Electoral Processes
#### Overrepresentation in Politics: A Growing Concern Globally
The issue of overrepresentation is not unique to Mexico and has been a subject of concern in various political systems around the world.
In recent years, countries such as India and Lebanon have faced debates over the proportionality of their electoral systems. For instance, India’s electoral framework, characterized by its first-past-the-post system, often results in skewed representation, prompting calls for electoral reforms.
Similarly, Lebanon’s confessionalist system has been critiqued for its inherent overrepresentation of certain sects, which some argue undermines true democratic representation.
In both cases, electoral reform advocates underscore the importance of aligning representation more closely with the actual vote distribution to ensure a fairer and more balanced political landscape.
As these global discussions evolve, Mexico’s reaffirmation of its constitutional limits on overrepresentation serves as a reminder of the complexities involved in maintaining electoral fairness and upholding judicial independence in the face of external pressures.